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A CASE FOR NON-ENFORCEMENT OF 
ANTI-RECORDING LAWS AGAINST 
CITIZEN RECORDERS 
“An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men 
to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of 
laws.”1 
INTRODUCTION  
In September of 2010, police officers in Roy, Utah shot and 
killed Todd Blair while executing a no-knock warrant to search 
his home for drugs.2 Roy Police Chief Greg Whinham claimed 
that Blair was holding a golf club above his head and that he 
approached the officer “in an attacking motion.”3 The Roy police 
recorded the incident.4 The Salt Lake Tribune posted the video on 
its website,5 and later the video was also uploaded to YouTube.6 
The video of the Blair shooting sparked a debate over whether the 
tactics the police used to raid Blair’s home went too far.7 Police 
investigators analyzed the video and cleared the officer of 
wrongdoing because he “had less than a second” to determine 
                                                                                                                  
1 THOMAS PAINE, Dissertations on First Principles of Government, in LIFE AND 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 242, 278 (Daniel Edwin Wheeler ed., 1908). 
2 Lana Groves & Pat Reavy, Roy Man Shot and Killed During Police Drug Raid, 
DESERET MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 2010, at B8. 
3 Id. 
4 Erin Alberty, Police Video Shows How Drug Raid Turned Deadly, SALT LAKE TRIB. 
(Dec. 24, 2010, 6:54 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/50932722-76/blair-burnett-
officers-police.html.csp?page=1 (updated March 29, 2011, 12:38 AM). 
5 Id. 
6 Blair Shooting.m4v, YOUTUBE (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WV6Bq8xeQrU&feature=player_embedded. 
7 See Ron Barnett & Paul Alongi, Critics Knock No-Knock Police Raids: The Increasing 
Use of Surprise Tactics Raises Privacy, Risk Questions, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2011, at 3A 
(criticizing no-knock warrants for giving residents “seconds to decide if they face a police raid 
or a home invasion”); Ryan Grim, Police Kill Man in Drug Raid Gone Wrong, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 18, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/18/utah-video-police-
kill-man-drug-raid_n_810420.html (updated May 25, 2011, 7:25 PM) (noting that “Blair’s death 
raises the question of why multiple heavily-armed [sic] officers were sent to raid a drug 
addict”). 
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whether Blair was holding a golf club or a sword.8 The Roy police 
department’s video recording of the Blair shooting was key in the 
debate over police tactics that followed the shooting, as well as 
the exoneration of the officer involved.9 
When citizens record the police, however, some police officers 
become camera-shy.10 In March 2010, Anthony Graber was pulled 
over for “popping a wheelie” on a Maryland highway while 
driving eighty miles per hour in a sixty-five mile-per-hour zone.11 
Graber had a small camera mounted on his bike helmet.12 The 
plain-clothes officer who pulled Graber over was “wielding a 
gun” while he approached Graber, but later holstered the weapon 
and gave Graber a speeding ticket.13 On March 10, Graber posted 
the video of his encounter with the officer on YouTube.14 
Prosecutors responded by obtaining a grand jury indictment 
alleging that Graber violated a Maryland wiretap law.15 
Maryland’s wiretapping statute prohibits a person from recording 
another person’s oral communications unless all parties consent to 
the recording.16 This statute and other so-called “all-party 
consent” wiretapping statutes apply where a citizen secretly 
records an oral communication.17 
The charges filed against Graber led to widespread criticism. 
Opponents cite the 1991 Rodney King video, which showed Los 
Angeles police officers unjustifiably beating King, as evidence 
that public recording of police can expose problems in police 
forces—racism and brutality in King’s case—and set the stage for 
                                                                                                                  
8 Alberty, supra note 4. 
9 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
10 Although the topic of this Note is the use of all-party consent statutes to prevent citizen 
recordings of police activities, police have not limited themselves to this method. See, e.g., 
Randy Ludlow, Deputy Confiscates Woman’s Cell Phone, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 30, 2010, 
at B1 (reporting that the police confiscated a woman’s cell phone she was using to record them 
because they feared it was a “cell phone gun”); see also Radley Balko, The War on Cameras, 
REASON.COM, Jan. 2011, at 22, 31, available at http://reason.com/archives/2010/12/07/the-war-
on-cameras (“In addition to arresting citizens with cameras for wiretapping, police can use 
vaguer catch-all charges, such as interfering with a police officer, refusing to obey a lawful 
order, or obstructing an arrest or police action.”). 
11 Annys Shin, From YouTube to Your Local Court, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010, at A1. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. For a video of the incident, see Cop Pulls Out Gun on Motorcyclist, YOUTUBE (June 
5, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RK5bMSyJCsg.  
15 Shin, supra note 11, at A1. 
16 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10–402(a)(1), (c)(3) (LexisNexis 2011) 
(prohibiting secret recording of oral conversations unless all parties consent).  
17 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 424 A.2d 344, 347 (Md. 1981) (noting that the Maryland 
statute prohibits the “aural acquisition of the contents of a communication by use of” an 
electronic device). 
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positive change.18 Some recent examples of newsworthy police 
recordings are the Oakland Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) 
shooting video, in which several private citizens used their cell 
phone cameras and various pocket-sized recording devices to 
capture a police officer shooting a suspect,19 and recordings of 
police interactions with Occupy Wall Street protestors, which 
show police using pepper spray against protestors.20 After the 
BART shooting videos were passed around on the Internet, a case 
“normally . . . played out in a courtroom” became “one in which 
anyone with an Internet connection [could] serve as virtual judge 
and jury.”21 The same can be said for the newscasts of the King 
video. These videos put police conduct on stark display and led to 
widespread debate.22  
Police recordings allow the public to view and debate police 
tactics. While the trooper’s conduct in the Graber incident was not 
as disturbing as the conduct of the police in the King, BART, 
Blair, or Occupy Wall Street incidents, some aspects of Graber’s 
traffic stop were troubling. The trooper in the Graber video “cut 
Graber off in an unmarked vehicle, approached Graber in plain 
clothes and yelled while brandishing a gun before identifying 
himself as a trooper.”23 If the public was barred from recording 
videos of on-duty police, it is unlikely that these instances of 
police abuse would have received the degree of attention and 
debate that they deserved. Prosecuting citizen recorders 
“discourages people from filming . . . even when they have a right 
to film.”24 The potential of receiving a substantial punishment25 
for recording police has a chilling effect on citizens who wish to 
record police misconduct. This Note argues that all-party consent 
                                                                                                                  
18 See Adam Cohen, Should Videotaping the Police Really Be a Crime?, TIME (Aug. 4, 
2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2008566,00.html (noting that “it’s not 
hard to see why police are wary of being filmed” due to the reaction to the King video). 
19 See Madison Gray, Bay Area Transit Cop Gets 2 Years in Passenger Shooting Death, 
TIME (Nov. 5, 2010), http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/11/05/bay-area-closely-watches-bart-
police-shooting-trial/. 
20 For an example of a prominent recording associated with Occupy Wall Street, see UC 
Davis Protestors Pepper Sprayed, YOUTUBE (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6AdDLhPwpp4. See also Maria L. La Ganga et al., Occupy 
Protests Put Police Tactics in Spotlight, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at 1 (reporting on 
the response to police tactics used to break up several Occupy Wall Street affiliated protests).  
21 Elinor Mills, Web Videos of Oakland Shooting Fuel Protests, CNET NEWS (Jan. 9, 
2009, 1:23 PM), http://news.cnet.com/web-videos-of-oakland-shooting-fuel-protests/. 
22 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting the debate surrounding public video 
recording of the police). 
23 Cohen, supra note 18. 
24 Id. 
25 For an overview of punishments for violations of all-party consent statutes, see infra 
Part I.C. 
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wiretapping laws are privacy laws that can only be properly 
construed to protect the privacy rights of private citizens and are 
not applicable to the recording of police while they are 
performing their public duties. Since many of these prosecutions 
rest on a faulty interpretation of all-party consent statutes, this 
Note recommends that law enforcement agents not bring charges 
based on the these statutes against citizen recorders. 
Part I of this Note presents a general background of federal and 
state wiretapping laws, focusing on different varieties of all-party 
consent statutes. Part II analyzes the privacy rights of on-duty 
police. Part III then examines the importance of public video 
recordings of on-duty police. Part IV discusses the problems 
raised by enforcing all-party consent statutes against citizen 
recorders, and looks at problems with current proposals to amend 
all-party consent statutes to allow police recording. Finally, Part 
V argues that, given the reduced expectation of privacy of police 
officers and the unlikelihood that citizen recorders will be 
convicted under an all-party consent wiretapping statute for 
recording police activities, police departments and prosecutors 
should adopt a voluntary policy of non-enforcement of all-party 
consent statutes against citizen recorders. 
I. ONE-PARTY AND ALL-PARTY WIRETAPPING STATUTES: A 
BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Wiretapping statutes come in two forms: all-party consent 
statutes and one-party consent statutes. This Part clarifies the 
difference between the two and provides a general background of 
these laws, and discusses state variations of all-party consent 
wiretapping statutes. Then, this Part briefly details different 
punishments under all-party consent statutes. Lastly, this Part 
analyzes the legislative intent behind all-party consent statutes. 
A. The Federal Wiretapping Statute and State One-Party Consent 
Statutes 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968,26 also known as the “Wiretap Act,”27 sets out the 
requirements for obtaining a legal wiretap and defines what 
                                                                                                                  
26 Pub. L. No. 90–351 §§ 801–802, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–2522 (2006)). 
27 See Privacy & Civil Liberties: Federal Statutes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, http://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1284 (last updated Apr. 
7, 2010) (discussing the background, amendments, and provisions of the Wiretap Act). 
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constitutes a legal wiretap.28 The Wiretap Act prohibits a private 
person from using a recording device to intercept an oral 
communication.29 The Act, however, permits a person to record 
his or her own conversations, or to intercept a conversation 
between two or more people where one of the parties to the 
conversation consents to the recording.30 Thus, the Act and other 
state statutes that track its language31 are referred to as “one-party 
consent” wiretapping laws. The Wiretap Act has two goals: (1) to 
“forbid[] the interception of wire, oral or electronic 
communications by private persons” unless one party consents to 
the interception and (2) to give law enforcement the ability to 
secure judicial approval of a wiretap in an effort to curb organized 
crime.32 While private citizens are not permitted to record a 
conversation unless one of the parties consents, police may 
secretly record conversations without consent provided that the 
recording is authorized by a judicial order.33 Finally, The Wiretap 
Act and state statutes following the one-party consent approach do 
not allow citizens to make recordings for a criminal or tortious 
purpose, regardless of whether one party consented to the 
recording.34 
                                                                                                                  
28 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006). 
29 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b).  
30 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (allowing a person “not acting under color of law” to record a 
conversation if that person is a party to the conversation or if “one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent to such interception”); see also CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & 
ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE 
§ 5:102, at 5–151 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that under the federal statute “it is legally permissible . . 
. [for a] private citizen not acting in cooperation with any government agent or agency . . . to 
intercept his or her own conversations, or to intercept communications between other people so 
long as one of the participants to the conversation gives prior consent”). 
31 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (2011) (prohibiting a person from “us[ing] an 
eavesdropping device to hear or record . . . an oral conversation without the consent of a party to 
the conversation”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–3005(A)(1)–(2) (2011) (prohibiting a private 
citizen from recording a conversation “at which he is not present”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2933.52(B)(4) (West 2006) (prohibiting using a recording device to intercept a communication 
unless a person is a member of law enforcement or “if the person is a party to the 
communication or if one of the parties to the communication has given the person prior consent 
to the interception, and if the communication is not intercepted for the purpose of committing a 
criminal offense or tortious act”). 
32 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 30, § 1:10, at 1–16–1–17.  
33 Id. at 1–17. 
34 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (permitting a person to record with the consent of one 
party, except where the recording is “for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious 
act”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6702(2)(e) (West 2011) (allowing interceptions of 
communications if one party consents but providing that “[i]t is unlawful to intercept any 
communication for the purpose of committing any criminal act”). For an overview of what 
constitutes a “criminal or tortious purpose,” see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 30, § 5:104. 
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B. All-Party Consent Anti-Wiretapping Statutes 
The Wiretap Act authorized states to enact their own 
wiretapping statutes,35 and most states have done so.36 The federal 
statute permits states to adopt statutory schemes that are more 
restrictive than the federal statute, but does not permit states to 
enact more permissive statutes.37 States were thus able to enact 
the more restrictive all-party consent wiretapping statutes that are 
at issue in this Note. 
Anthony Graber’s prosecution involved the application of an 
all-party consent wiretapping statute.38 All-party consent 
wiretapping statutes prohibit recording a conversation unless all 
the parties to that conversation consent to the recording. Thirteen 
states currently have all-party consent laws.39 Maryland, for 
example, makes it a crime to “[w]illfully intercept . . . any wire, 
oral, or electronic communication”40 but allows a person to 
intercept a “wire, oral, or electronic communication where the 
person is a party to the communication and where all of the 
parties to the communication have given prior consent to the 
interception.”41 The Maryland statute, like eleven of the thirteen 
all-party consent statutes, specifies that only the secret recording 
of a private conversation is prohibited.42 The prosecution in the 
Graber case argued that Graber violated the Maryland all-party 
                                                                                                                  
35 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 30, § 1:22, at 1–34 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(2)); 
see also J. Peter Bodri, Comment, Tapping into Police Conduct: The Improper Use of 
Wiretapping Laws to Prosecute Citizens Who Record On-Duty Police, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1327, 1334 (2011) (pointing out that a state wiretapping law must be at least as 
restrictive as the Wiretap Act, and may be more restrictive). 
36 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 30, § 1:22 (listing references to state 
wiretapping statutes). 
37 Id. at 1–34.  
38 See Shin, supra note 11, at A1 (noting that the Maryland law under which Graber was 
convicted requires all recorded parties to consent).  
39 See Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape 
Recording to Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1549 n.2, n.6 (2008) (citing the 
thirteen state statutes that require all parties to consent before recording a conversation).  
40 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10–402(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011). 
41 CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10–402(c)(3). 
42 See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10–401(2)(i) (defining “oral communication” for the purposes 
of the Maryland all-party consent statute as “any conversation or words spoken to or by any 
person in private conversation”). For other state statutes with similar provisions, see, e.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 2010) (prohibiting the secret recording of a “confidential 
communication” without the consent of all parties to that communication); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 1335(a)(4) (2007) (providing that a person is guilty of a “violation of privacy” if that 
person records a communication by any “means of communicating privately, including private 
conversation”); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1)(b) (West 2011) (prohibiting recording a 
“[p]rivate communication, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit 
such conversation . . . without first obtaining the consent of all persons engaged in the 
conversation.”).  
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consent wiretapping law by videotaping his conversation with the 
trooper who pulled him over without first obtaining that trooper’s 
consent to be recorded.43 
Two states’ wiretapping statutes can plausibly be construed to 
apply to all communications, whether private or not. The Illinois 
wiretapping statute forbids a person from recording a 
conversation “unless [that person] does so . . . with the consent of 
all of the parties to such conversation . . . .”44 Illinois defines a 
conversation as “any oral communication between [two] or more 
persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended 
their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances 
justifying that expectation.”45 The Massachusetts wiretapping 
statute prohibits the “interception . . . of any . . . oral 
communication,” and provides that “‘interception’ means to 
. . . secretly record the contents of any . . . oral communication.”46 
Because these two statutes specifically apply to all oral 
communications, they could prohibit citizen recordings of 
police.47 
C. Punishments Under Wiretapping Statutes 
All-party consent wiretapping laws have a wide variety of 
potential punishments. The federal wiretapping statute imposes a 
maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment for private 
citizens who violate the statute.48 State all-party consent statutes 
have a variety of punishments, ranging anywhere from a $2,500 
fine49 to a misdemeanor charge and the destruction of the 
recording50 to a five-year prison sentence and a $10,000 fine.51 
                                                                                                                  
43 See Shin, supra note 11, at A1 (“[P]rosecutors . . . obtained a grand jury indictment 
alleging [Graber] had violated state wiretap laws by recording the trooper without his 
consent.”). 
44 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14–2(a)(1)(A) (West 2003). 
45 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14–1(d). 
46 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4), (C)(1) (West 2000) (emphasis added). 
47 For state court cases involving the applicability of similar statutes to police recordings, 
see infra Part II.B. 
48 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (2006) (providing that whoever intentionally intercepts a 
communication without the consent of one party will be fined, imprisoned for up to 5 years, or 
both).  
49 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 2010) (creating a punishment for violation of 
eavesdropping laws not to exceed $2,500, one year in prison, or both). 
50 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 711–1111(4) (West 2011) (punishing violators of the statute 
with a second degree misdemeanor and allowing the court to order “the destruction of any 
recording made in violation of this section”). 
51 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10–402(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (punishing 
violators of the statute with a felony charge, and “imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a 
fine of not more than $10,000, or both”). 
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Some all-party consent statutes create different levels of 
punishment depending on what the offender recorded;52 others 
impose lighter sentences for first-time violators and impose 
harsher sentences for repeat violators.53  
D. Legislative Intent of All-Party Consent Statutes 
The legislative history for all-party consent statutes is sparse, 
but what is available indicates that they were enacted to protect 
the privacy rights of citizens. Broadly speaking, the legislative 
history refers to two goals: (1) to protect the privacy of 
communications; and (2) to give police the ability to conduct 
lawful wiretaps.54 The Florida and Massachusetts all-party 
statutes contain legislative findings, which illuminate the purpose 
of the wiretapping statutes. The Florida statute provides that its 
goal is to “safeguard the privacy of innocent persons” by 
permitting interception without the consent of all parties “only 
when authorized by a court.”55 The preamble to the Massachusetts 
statute states that it was enacted with two general purposes: (1) to 
restrict the right of legal secret recording to the police and (2) to 
protect all other citizens from clandestine recording without their 
prior consent.56 After first declaring that law enforcement officials 
must be allowed to use secret recording methods because 
“[n]ormal investigative procedures are not effective in the 
investigation of illegal acts committed by organized crime,” the 
preamble goes on to state that “the secret use of [electronic 
recording] devices by private individuals must be prohibited.”57 
The Massachusetts legislature’s concern was that “the 
uncontrolled development of and unrestricted use of modern 
electronic surveillance devices pose grave dangers to the privacy 
of all citizens of [Massachusetts].”58  
                                                                                                                  
52 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(c) (2007) (making it a misdemeanor to intercept a 
party’s communication without all the consent of all parties, and making it a felony to 
surreptitiously record someone who is getting undressed). 
53 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–8–213(3)(a) (2011) (penalizing first-time violators with a 
fine of up to $500, a six-month jail sentence in county jail, or both); § 45–8–213(3)(b) 
(penalizing second-time violators with a one-year county jail sentence, a fine of up to $1000, or 
both); § 45–8–213(3)(c) (penalizing third-time violators with up to a 5-year sentence in prison, a 
fine of up to $10,000, or both). 
54 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.01(4) (West 2001) (stating that, to protect privacy, 
wiretapping should be permitted only by court authorization and limited to the investigation of a 
select number of crimes); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(A) (West 2000) (same). 
55 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.01(4). 
56 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(A). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The legislative history for these statutes, then, contains two 
separate goals: one for citizens and one for police. They 
unquestionably reflect a concern for the privacy of citizens.59 But 
at the same time, these statutes are also meant to enable the police 
to conduct lawful wiretaps. There is no indication in any of the 
available legislative history that all-party consent statutes were 
intended to protect the privacy of anyone other than private 
citizens. 
II. PRIVACY RIGHTS, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, AND PUBLIC PLACES: A 
REDUCED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY FOR ON-DUTY POLICE 
OFFICERS 
The Graber case received a great deal of coverage, likely due 
to the apparent incongruity of applying a statute designed to 
protect the privacy rights of citizens to shield police officers from 
public scrutiny. Graber’s case is another example in a recent trend 
of applying old privacy laws in novel ways that appear to run 
counter to the proper scope of those laws.60 First, this Part asks 
whether police privacy expectations can be viewed as being 
objectively reasonable, given that police officers are public 
officials and given the proliferation and general acceptance of 
recording devices. Then, this Part reviews various courts’ analysis 
of police privacy rights when determining whether to apply all-
party consent statutes to citizen recordings. 
A. Privacy Rights of On-Duty Police Officers 
The proliferation of recording devices has had a strong impact 
on the public perception of what may and may not properly be 
considered “private.” The reduced expectation of privacy that 
results from the proliferation of new technology has been litigated 
frequently since Katz v. United States.61 Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Katz laid out a two-pronged requirement for 
determining whether a privacy interest exists: A person must have 
                                                                                                                  
59 See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 972–73 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Massachusetts statute was amended to set guidelines for judicially 
approved wiretaps, to prevent the “newly discovered practice of private telephone companies’ 
eavesdropping on the conversations of [their] private customers,” and to prevent private 
investigators and private persons from bugging telephones). 
60 See, e.g., L.L. Brasier, Is Reading Wife’s E-Mail a Crime?, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 
26, 2010, at 7A (reporting that a Michigan statute “typically used to prosecute such crimes as 
identity theft or stealing trade secrets” was being used to prosecute a man for logging on to his 
wife’s computer and reading an e-mail correspondence which revealed she was having an 
affair). 
61 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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“an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and . . . the 
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”62  
Cases analyzing the Katz test are useful in demonstrating how 
the proliferation of “intrusive” technology can chip away at 
privacy expectations. These decisions demonstrate that as 
intrusive technology becomes more commonly used, people have 
less of a reasonable expectation that the new technology will not 
intrude their privacy.63 Kyllo v. United States64 demonstrates how 
the Supreme Court has treated intrusions by new technology. In 
Kyllo, the police argued that using a thermal-imaging device to 
view heat waves coming off of a suspect’s house did not invade 
the suspect’s privacy because the imaging device did not expose 
the private details of the suspect’s home.65 But the Court held that 
in cases involving new technology “[w]here . . . the Government 
uses a device that is not in general public use,” people have an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy from the use of that 
technology to reveal the contents of their private spaces.66 And 
since the thermal-imaging device the government used was not in 
general public use, the Court held that the government violated 
the suspect’s subjective and objective expectations of privacy by 
using the new technology to view heat waves coming off of his 
home.67 Kyllo singled out technology that is “not in general public 
use” when it held that the government’s use of thermal imaging 
was an unreasonable search.68 This suggests that there is a 
reduced expectation of privacy from technology that is in general 
public use. 
Under the Court’s reasoning in Kyllo, people likely have a 
decreased expectation of privacy in being recorded—at least when 
they are in public. From the King beating to the BART shooting, 
video recording technology has proliferated to the point that it is 
now in general use. While possessing a video recorder in 1991 
was a “then-rare fortuity,” today video recordings of police-
citizen encounters are “the norm, more frequent and more widely 
                                                                                                                  
62 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that “the 
Supreme Court has insisted, ever since [Katz], that the meaning of a Fourth Amendment search 
must change to keep pace with the march of science”). 
64 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
65 Id. at 35. 
66 Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
67 Id.  
68 Id. 
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disseminated, within and without the news media.”69 A private 
citizen recorded the King beating from the terrace of his home 
using a Sony Handycam.70 Contrast this with the BART shooting, 
in which multiple onlookers recorded the shooting using cell 
phone cameras and posted their videos to the Internet.71 Recording 
devices are ubiquitous in today’s society. As recording devices 
become more prevalent (or even commonplace), it becomes 
increasingly unreasonable for police to expect the performance of 
their duties to go unrecorded. 
The Supreme Court has also attached a lessened expectation of 
privacy in public places. In Katz, the Court recognized that 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”72 Subsequent cases have followed this approach. For 
example, in United States v. Knotts,73 police officers placed a 
beeper in a five-gallon container of chloroform.74 The police then 
arranged for that container to be sold to a suspected drug dealer, 
and after he purchased it, used the beeper inside of the container 
to track the suspect’s movements.75 The Court held that this was 
not an invasion of privacy and that no search took place because 
“[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another.”76 The clear trend from the time that Katz 
was decided seems to point toward a very limited expectation of 
                                                                                                                  
69 Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights 
Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 617–18 (2009). 
70 Michael Goldstein, The Other Beating, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at A2.  
71 See Mills, supra note 21 (discussing the recordings and providing multiple links to 
different recordings of the BART shooting).  
72 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
73 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
74 Id. at 278. 
75 Id. at 278–79. 
76 Id. at 281. The Supreme Court has recently decided another GPS tracking case, and 
clarified that “the Katz reasonable expectation-of-privacy test has added to, not substituted for, 
the common-law trespassatory test.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012). In 
Jones, the challenged search was one in which police attached a GPS tracking device “on the 
undercarriage of [a] Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot.” Id. at 947. The Court 
distinguished this search from the search in Knotts, reasoning that the “common law 
trespassatory test” for a search was not at issue in Knotts becase “[t]he beeper had been placed 
in [a] container before it came into Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner.” Id. 
at 952. The Court noted that it was irrelevant to its analysis that the exterior of the car was 
exposed to the public, holding that “[b]y attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on 
a protected area” under the trespassatory test. Id. The Court, however, clarified that “[s]ituations 
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to 
Katz analysis.” Id. at 953. Because recording police performing public duties is more akin to the 
transmission of data than to the common-law trespass at issue in Jones, this Note analyzes the 
issue under Katz and its progeny. 
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privacy in public places. When police officers perform functions 
in public, under the reasoning of the Katz line of cases, they have 
a reduced expectation of privacy. 
Police also have less privacy expectations due to their status as 
public figures and public employees. Joseph Cassilly, the 
Maryland prosecutor who pursued charges against Anthony 
Graber, however, argued that “not everything a police officer does 
on the job should be for public consumption.”77 Cassilly drew a 
line between large gatherings, where police arguably have little 
expectation of privacy, and situations where there are fewer 
people around, where police have a heightened expectation of 
privacy.78 But, in the defamation context, the Supreme Court has 
concluded that public officials have a decreased expectation of 
privacy by virtue of their status as public officials.79 The 
reasoning behind this position is relatively straightforward: “It is 
inconsistent with democracy and democratic political 
accountability for government officials to have protectable 
privacy interests when performing official functions, especially in 
the context of adversarial encounters with members of the 
public.”80  
Similarly, commentators have unanimously concluded that 
police officers have a decreased expectation of privacy when 
taking into consideration the proliferation of recording devices, 
the fact that police are public employees, and the fact that many 
(if not most) police-citizen interactions take place on public 
streets and in public places.81 But even though all-party consent 
                                                                                                                  
77 Radley Balko, Police Officers Don’t Check Their Civil Rights at the Station House 
Door, REASON.COM (Aug. 9, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/08/09/police-officers-dont-
check-the. 
78 See id. (“Generally, Cassilly says, police actions in front of large crowds of people can 
probably be recorded. But citizen recorders put themselves in legal jeopardy when there are 
fewer people around, and an officer is more likely to think his conversations are private.”). 
79 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (“[P]ublic men, are, as it 
were, public property . . . .” (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 n.18 (1952))). 
80 Wasserman, supra note 69, at 650. 
81 See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for 
Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public 
Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 487, 514–15 (2011) (concluding that “police 
officers in the public performance of their duties do not own an objective expectation of 
privacy”); Bodri, supra note 35, at 1343 (finding that “there is no expectation of privacy in an 
on-duty police officer’s interactions with citizens because all statements that on-duty police 
officers make to private citizens in public spaces are knowingly exposed to the public”); N. 
Stewart Hanley, Note, A Dangerous Trend: Arresting Citizens for Recording Law Enforcement, 
34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 645, 653–54 (2011) (concluding that “[t]he right of the public to know 
how police are conducting their duties simply outweighs the individual privacy concerns” of 
police officers); Marianne F. Kies, Note, Policing the Police: Freedom of the Press, the Right to 
Privacy, and Civilian Recordings of Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 274, 300 (2011) 
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wiretapping statutes are, at their core, privacy statutes, courts 
have come to contradictory conclusions regarding the 
applicability of these statutes to citizen recordings of on-duty 
police performing public duties. 
B. State Courts and Police Privacy Rights 
Recent charges against citizen recorders have produced mixed 
results. Maryland Circuit Court Judge Emory A. Plitt dismissed 
the charges against Anthony Graber for secretly recording an 
officer during a traffic stop.82 Judge Plitt dismissed these charges 
in part because public officials who exercise their “power in a 
public forum . . . should not expect [their] activity to be shielded 
from public scrutiny.”83 This decision also recognized the 
increased availability of recording devices and the resulting loss 
of privacy. Judge Plitt noted that recording technology has 
“changed rapidly as to cost, size, weight, quality and storage 
systems,” and that “stationary and portable cameras and other 
recording devices are everywhere.”84  
In Florida, another state that has an all-party consent 
wiretapping statute, a woman who was charged for recording her 
son’s arrest had all charges against her dropped.85 Other states, 
however, have pressed ahead with prosecutions for recording 
police. For instance, in Illinois, Christopher Drew was charged 
under that state’s eavesdropping statute for recording a police 
encounter that took place on the streets in Chicago.86 The judge in 
                                                                                                                  
 
(finding that police officers have “a legitimate expectation of privacy that derives from the 
penumbras of the Bill of Rights,” but recognizing that this right “is seriously diminished while 
on duty due to the public nature of their office”); Mishra, supra note 39, at 1552 (arguing that 
enforcing all-party consent statutes against citizens recorders “overprotect[s] police officers’ 
privacy while in the line of duty” and “is inconsistent with most sources of privacy values in our 
legal culture”); Lisa A. Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the 
Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police 
Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1006 (2009) (concluding that “[t]he privacy concerns at 
the forefront of anti-wiretapping laws were to protect private citizens from law enforcement 
officers, not the reverse”). 
82 Pete Hermann, Judge Says Man Within Rights to Record Police Traffic Stop, BALT. 
SUN, Sept. 27, 2010, at 1A. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Allison Bybee, Lawsuit Filed: Mom Arrested for Recording Son’s Arrest, FOX 29 
WFLX.COM (Aug. 4, 2010, 1:08 PM), http://www.wflx.com/Global/story.asp?S=12924814 
(reporting that a mother charged under Florida’s eavesdropping statute for recording her son’s 
arrest was filing a lawsuit against the department). 
86 Radley Balko, Illinois: Where Recording On-Duty Cops is Treated Like Sexual Assault, 
REASON.COM (May 20, 2010), http://reason.com/blog/2010/05/20/illinois-where-videotaping-
on. 
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this case rejected Drew’s motion to dismiss,87 and Drew is 
currently awaiting trial.88 
Several courts considered the applicability of all-party consent 
statutes to citizen recordings of police prior to the proliferation of 
handheld recording devices in the 2000s, arriving at contradictory 
conclusions. Massachusetts took the most restrictive approach in 
upholding the application of all-party consent laws to police 
encounters. In Commonwealth v. Hyde,89 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts upheld the conviction of a citizen for 
recording the police in contravention of the Massachusetts all-
party consent statute.90 The current Massachusetts statute, which 
is identical to the statute at issue in Hyde,91 prohibits a private 
person from “secretly record[ing] the contents of any . . . oral 
communication” unless all parties consent.92 In Hyde, a citizen 
was prosecuted for secretly recording the police during a traffic 
stop.93 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
“because the police officers were performing official police duties 
during the stop of his car, they had no privacy expectations in 
their words.”94 The majority, however, upheld the defendant’s 
conviction, engaging in what it characterized as a 
“straightforward matter of statutory interpretation” to come to the 
conclusion that “[s]ecret tape recording by private individuals has 
been unequivocally banned.”95 To support this conclusion, the 
majority relied on a portion of the wiretapping statute’s preamble, 
which stated that Massachusetts enacted a stricter anti-
wiretapping statute due to concern over the increased availability 
of electronic recording devices and “the recognition that there was 
no way effectively to prohibit the sale or manufacture of these 
devices.”96  
The Hyde dissent analyzed the Massachusetts statute’s 
legislative history to conclude that the statute does not apply to 
citizen recordings of police.97 The dissent argued that “[t]here is 
                                                                                                                  
87 Id. 
88 Paris Schutz, Eavesdropping Law, WTTW CHICAGO TONIGHT (Dec. 15, 2011, 12:00 
PM), http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/comment/3732. 
89 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001). 
90 Id. at 971. 
91 See id. at 966 (discussing the Massachusetts all-party statute at issue in the case). 
92 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (West 2000). 
93 Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 964–65. The defendant in Hyde recorded a police altercation using 
a hidden hand-held tape recorder. Id. at 965. 
94 Id. at 965. 
95 Id. at 970–71. 
96 Id. at 966. 
97 Id.at 971–77 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
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no hint in the legislative history that the Legislature contemplated 
the circumstances at issue in this criminal case: the tape recording 
of an encounter on a public way between a citizen and a police 
officer engaged in his official duties.”98 Rather, the dissent argued 
that the Massachusetts legislature intended the all-party statute to 
allow “police to engage in secret electronic surveillance of 
citizens suspected of organized crime” and “to protect the privacy 
of citizens.”99 The dissent concluded that Massachusetts’s all-
party consent statute was never intended to apply to citizen 
recordings of police.100 
A Washington case, State v. Flora,101 dealt with an all-party 
consent statute but reached a different conclusion than the Hyde 
majority opinion.102 In Flora, the defendant secretly placed a tape 
recorder in a stack of papers to record the police during an 
encounter; the police noticed and confiscated the tape recorder 
after the defendant was arrested.103 The court held that a 
conversation incidental to an arrest is “not entitled to be 
private.”104 Instead of broadly holding that no conversation 
between a citizen and a police officer is private, the court held 
that whether a conversation is private is a “fact-specific 
inquiry.”105 The court—emphasizing that this arrest involved 
“public officers performing an official function on a public 
thoroughfare in the presence of a third party and within the sight 
and hearing of passersby”—determined that the police could not 
assert a privacy interest under the Washington statute.106 Unlike 
the Hyde decision, Flora took into account whether a police-
citizen conversation should be considered private. This was 
similar to the court’s line of reasoning in the dismissal of the 
charges against Anthony Graber.107  
                                                                                                                  
98 Id. at 973. 
99 Id.  
100 See id. at 972 (noting that intent of the statute was to regulate the government’s use of 
wiretaps and protect the privacy of citizens from nongovernment surveillance). 
101 845 P.2d 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
102 Washington’s electronic surveillance statute prohibits recording private 
conversations without the prior consent of all parties to that communication. See WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1)(a) (West 2011) (prohibiting the recording of any “[p]rivate 
conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit said 
communication”). 
103 Flora, 845 P.2d at 1356. 
104 Id. at 1358. 
105 Id. at 1357. 
106 Id. 
107 See Hermann, supra note 82, at 1A (reasoning that the police, in exercising their 
“power in a public forum . . . should not expect [their] activity to be shielded from public 
scrutiny”). 
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An Illinois case analyzing a similar statute came to the same 
conclusion as Flora. In People v. Beardsley,108 a case involving 
the application of a previous version of the Illinois all-party 
consent statute,109 a driver tape recorded an officer during a traffic 
stop despite that officer’s refusal to consent to the recording.110 
Later, the driver recorded a conversation between the officer who 
pulled him over and another officer who arrived later at the scene 
without the knowledge of either officer.111 The driver argued that 
the officers impliedly consented to this recording because they 
were both aware that he had recording equipment and was using 
that equipment.112 The court, however, sidestepped this argument 
and instead held that this recording did not violate the wiretapping 
statute: 
“The primary factor in determining whether the defendant 
. . . committed the offense of eavesdropping is not 
. . . whether all of the parties consented to the recording of 
the conversation. Rather, it is whether the [officers] 
intended their conversation to be of a private nature under 
circumstances justifying such expectation.”113  
Because the officers had this discussion in the squad car while the 
driver sat in the back seat of that car, the court found that there 
was no expectation that this would be a private conversation. If 
the officers intended it to be a private conversation, they would 
have left the car and held their conversation elsewhere.114  
After the Beardsley decision, it should be noted that the Illinois 
legislature amended the eavesdropping statute. Under the 
amended statute, a “conversation” is defined as any oral 
communication between parties “regardless of whether one or 
more of the parties intended their communication to be of a 
private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation.”115 
                                                                                                                  
108 503 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. 1986). 
109 The current version of the statute prohibits surreptitious recording of a conversation or 
electronic communication unless a party does so “with the consent of all of the parties to such 
conversation or electronic communication.” See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14–2(a)(1) (West 
2003). 
110 Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 347. 
111 Id. at 348. 
112 Id. (“The defendant . . . argues that [the police officers] impliedly consented to the 
recording of their conversation. The defendant maintains that the officers knew the defendant 
had the tape recorder with him in the back seat of the squad car and, yet, they neither physically 
removed it from his possession nor verbally stopped the defendant by warning him not to record 
their conversation.”). 
113 Id. at 350. 
114 Id.  
115 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14–1(d) (West 2003); see also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 
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Courts that have considered this amended text have concluded 
that “it was not the legislature’s intent to provide a definition of 
‘conversation’ so broad as to encompass any audible expression 
whatsoever.”116 But courts have generally interpreted the statute 
to “prohibit the recording of any conversation without the consent 
of all parties regardless of any party’s expectation of privacy.”117 
Beardsley may well have reached a different result if it was tried 
under the amended Illinois all-party statute. 
Since Hyde, Flora, and Beardsley were decided, portable 
recording devices have proliferated to the point that they are 
generally available. Hyde, decided in 2001, is the most recent of 
the three decisions. The Hyde court expressed concern over the 
proliferation of recording devices,118 and this concern has only 
been confirmed since that 2001 decision. Most cell phones today 
are capable of recording both audio and video, and there are 
ample channels available on the Internet for people to display 
their recordings.119 And people now more commonly use the 
recording devices on their cell phones.120 This results in a 
situation where “Big Brother is watching the people, but the 
people are watching him” due to “a balance of power in which all 
sides can record most police-public encounters occurring on the 
street and in the stationhouse.”121 As recording devices have 
become increasingly commonplace, all people (including police 
officers) have lost some sense of privacy from being recorded in 
public places. The Katz line of cases suggests that the more 
recording devices are used in society, the less objectively 
                                                                                                                  
 
750 N.E.2d 963, 970 n.10 (Mass. 2001) (justifying its holding that the Massachusetts 
wiretapping statute applies to conversations between citizens and police by describing the 
Beasley holding and its legislative aftermath in Illinois). 
116 DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 90 F. Supp. 2d 922, 924 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (quoting In re 
Marriage of Almquist, 704 N.E.2d 68, 71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)) (quotation and alterations 
omitted). 
117 People v. Nunez, 756 N.E.2d 941, 952 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (quoting In re Marriage of 
Almquist, 704 N.E.2d at 71) (quotations and alterations omitted). 
118 See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966 (finding that the legislature, in amending the 
Massachusetts anti-wiretapping act to require the consent of all parties to a recording, was in 
part concerned with the increased availability of recording devices). 
119 See Wasserman, supra note 69, at 600 (“New portable technology . . . enables people to 
produce their own personal records of their lives and environment, including their 
confrontations with police . . . [a]nd an ever-expanding bevy of internet sites . . . enable them to 
disseminate those recordings directly to the world . . . .”). 
120 See Aaron Smith, Mobile Access 2010, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 
(July 7, 2010), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Mobile-Access-2010/Summary-of-
Findings.aspx (finding that the percentage of cell phone owners who have used their phone to 
record a video has increased from 19 percent in April 2009 to 34 percent in May 2010). 
121 Wasserman, supra note 69, at 601.  
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reasonable an expectation of privacy from them becomes.122 This 
increased availability of recording devices and decreased 
expectation of privacy, coupled with police officers’ status as 
public officials and the fact that most of their interactions with 
citizens take place in public, suggests that courts should be more 
willing to dismiss charges for recording police than they were at 
the time Hyde was decided.  
III. THE IMPACT OF POLICE RECORDINGS ON PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
AND IN THE COURTROOM 
Video recordings of police have become increasingly 
commonplace in recent years.123 These recordings help to inform 
the public and to enrich the public debate over what is or is not 
abusive behavior. Video evidence is particularly valuable because 
videos provide the viewer a direct look at a particular interaction 
between police and citizens, and thus the viewer is more likely to 
view the video as a credible account of the interaction.124 Laws 
that impose a penalty on citizens for recording police, however, 
may deter citizens from making these recordings. This Part 
analyzes the importance of recording police officers, both in terms 
of these recordings’ value to the public at large, and their value as 
evidence in civil and criminal actions involving the police.  
                                                                                                                  
122 See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text (arguing that as technology becomes 
more widely available that people have a decreased expectation of privacy related to that 
technology). It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), clarified that the common-law trespass test for determining 
whether a search has occurred still has bearing on the Katz analysis. In Jones, the Court noted 
that its “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the 
latter half of the 20th century,” and specifically noted that later cases, including Katz, “have 
deviated from that exclusively property-based approach.” Id. at 950–51. The Jones Court made 
it clear that it was not “mak[ing] trespass the exclusive test,” and clarified that “[s]ituations 
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to 
Katz analysis.” Id. at 953. The act that is the subject of this Note—the videotaping of police 
performing their public duties—is more similar to the transmission of electronic signals than it 
is to the sort of trespass at issue in Jones. Therefore, the implications of the Jones opinion on the 
rights of citizens to record police are not discussed at length in this Note. 
123 See Michael Newsom, House OKs Citizens Taping Law Officers: Author Expects 
Senate to Kill Measure, SUN HERALD (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.sunherald.com/2011/02/14/2862780/house-oks-citizens-taping-law.html (describing 
the practice of “cop watching,” where citizen activists routinely tape on-duty police officers). 
See also Cohen, supra note 18 (reporting that the NAACP has recently started to encourage its 
members to videotape their interactions with police officers). 
124 See Wasserman, supra note 69, at 619 (noting that video evidence offers fact finders—
either a jury or the public at large—an eyewitness with which they are unlikely to disagree).  
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A. The Role of Police Recordings in Exposing Police Conduct to 
the Public 
Videotapes of police conduct have helped to shape and change 
police policy. The most notable example of this is the 
investigation following the Rodney King beating. Los Angeles 
Mayor Tom Bradley established a commission to investigate the 
King beating in the wake of the incident.125 The commission’s 
report stated that it “owe[d] its existence to the [King beating] 
videotape.”126 Because “the report of the involved officers was 
falsified,” which thwarted an attempt by King’s brother to file a 
complaint, the commission concluded that the videotape was the 
key factor that led to the investigation.127 The commission found 
that there were “a significant number of LAPD officers who 
repetitively misuse force and persistently ignore the written 
policies and guidelines of the Department regarding force.”128  
The importance of the King video cannot be overstated. If this 
recording was never made, there likely would have been no 
investigation into the LAPD’s abusive tactics. Even if there was 
an investigation, “without the [King beating] videotape the 
complaint might have been adjudged to be ‘not sustained,’ 
because the officers’ version conflicted with the account by King 
and his two passengers.”129 As the Hyde dissent notes, however, if 
the person who taped King lived in a state that penalized citizens 
for recording police, he “would have been exposed to criminal 
indictment rather than lauded for exposing an injustice.”130 The 
King video ultimately put the LAPD’s abusive tactics under 
public scrutiny. Citizen recordings such as the King video may 
negatively impact the public’s perception of police. But allowing 
citizen recording will ultimately strengthen public confidence in 
the police, as police departments change and improve procedures 
as new incidents are brought to light. 
                                                                                                                  
125 INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT ii (1991) [hereinafter LAPD 
REPORT], available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/1%20-
%20Chistopher%20Commision.pdf. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at ix. 
129 Id. at ii. 
130 Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 972 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting). California is an all-party consent state, but there have been no reported prosecutions 
for recording police using California’s all-party statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 
2010) (prohibiting private citizens from “intentionally and without consent of all parties to a 
confidential communication” from recording that communication). 
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B. The Impact of Police Recordings as Evidence 
The Supreme Court has long recognized a right, rooted in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause131 and the Sixth 
Amendment’s Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses,132 
which “guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity 
to present a complete defense.’”133 The use of video recordings in 
cases involving citizens making assertions against police can be a 
crucial aid in the truth-seeking function of courts. The use of 
video recordings is particularly important in situations such as the 
BART shooting, in which the police use deadly force and 
therefore the victim cannot testify.134 Police may also use citizen 
recordings to defend themselves in civil suits.135 If a state 
prevents citizens from recording their interactions with police, it 
arguably deprives citizens of due process and their right to present 
a defense at trial by preventing this evidence from being created 
at the outset. 
Citizen recordings are particularly important when considering 
that modern police often observe the so-called “Blue Code of 
Silence,” a norm against reporting other officers’ misconduct.136 
One commentator theorizes that the officers charged in the 
Rodney King beating were willing to use abusive tactics because 
they “must have believed that they could count on their colleagues 
to lie in a case of investigation.”137 In addition, the possibility that 
                                                                                                                  
131 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
132 U.S. CONST. amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him [and] to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor.”). 
133 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 
U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). 
134 See Jeremy R. Lacks, Note, The Lone American Dictatorship: How Court Doctrine and 
Police Culture Limit Judicial Oversight of the Police Use of Deadly Force, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 391, 416–17 (2008) (“[W]hen deadly force is employed . . . there will necessarily 
be a dramatic asymmetry in the information and perspective available to the fact finder that 
favors the police.”). 
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing that police who deprive a citizen of his or her 
rights may be held liable to that person “in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress”); see also Wasserman, supra note 69, at 618 (“Video evidence is 
uniquely important in civil rights actions arising from police-public confrontations.”). 
136 Lacks, supra note 134, at 420 (quoting Jerome H. Skolnick, Corruption and the Blue 
Code of Silence, 3 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 7, 7 (2002)) (“[C]ontemporary police culture often 
demands that officers lie or conceal the truth to protect their own. . . . [T]he police ‘Blue Code 
of Silence’ is an ‘embedded feature of police culture’ that commands loyalty and brotherhood 
among officers . . . .”). 
137 Id. at 421 (quoting Jerome H. Skolnick, It’s Not Just a Few Rotten Apples: The Beating 
of Rodney King Reignites Los Angeles’ Debate on Police Conduct, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at 
B7) (quotation marks omitted). 
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a court will suppress evidence obtained from an unlawful search 
or seizure has led to the practice of “testilying” among police.138 
Indeed, the commission that investigated the King beating noted 
that the King video was crucial to the investigation of the LAPD 
because “the report of the involved officers was falsified.”139 
Without the video, King’s account and the officers’ falsified 
reports would have been the only evidence of police misconduct. 
Without the videotape to visually demonstrate to the public the 
true circumstances of the King beating, the general public would 
likely have ignored the incident.  
Several recent Supreme Court decisions highlight the 
importance of video recordings as evidence. In Scott v. Harris,140 
the majority’s opinion included a link to a video of a high-speed 
chase to bolster its conclusion that an officer did not use excessive 
force to terminate the chase.141 Scott reached the Supreme Court 
on appeal from a summary judgment,142 and “[the driver’s] 
version of events . . . differ[ed] substantially from [the officer’s] 
version.”143 The Court looked to a videotape of the incident and 
determined that the videotape contradicted the driver’s story.144 
The Court recognized that at the summary judgment stage the 
facts must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.”145 But it added the wrinkle that “[w]hen 
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is 
blatantly contradicted by the record . . . a court should not adopt 
that version of the facts . . . .”146 The majority responded to the 
dissent’s claim that it was misrepresenting the events depicted in 
the video by posting the video to the Internet and inviting anyone 
to view its contents.147  
A more recent case from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, Norse v. City of Santa Cruz,148 also 
employed this approach. In Norse, the plaintiff sued the City of 
                                                                                                                  
138 WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 39 (1999). 
139 LAPD REPORT, supra note 125, at ii.  
140 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
141 Id. at 378 n.5. 
142 Id. at 378. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. at 378–79 (finding that the videotape contradicted the respondent’s claim that 
during the chase there was little threat to pedestrians). 
145 Id. at 380. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 378 n.5 (responding to Justice Stevens’ claim that the majority was 
“misrepresenting [the video’s] contents” by “allow[ing] the video to speak for itself” and 
providing a link). 
148 629 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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Santa Cruz after he was ejected from a city council meeting for 
making a “Nazi salute.”149 In a concurring opinion, Judge 
Kozinski stated that it was “clear that the council members [were 
not] entitled to qualified immunity” because the plaintiff’s “sieg 
heil was momentary and casual, causing no disruption 
whatsoever.”150 To support his claim, Judge Kozinski included a 
link to a YouTube video of the incident.151 Norse’s use of the 
Scott v. Harris “see for yourself” approach152 suggests that the 
approach has gained acceptance among lower courts.  
Some comments accompanying a recent Supreme Court denial 
of certiorari highlight the impact that video recordings can have 
on the fact finder. In Kelly v. California,153 the Court denied 
certiorari in two cases challenging the admissibility in the penalty 
phase of death penalty trials of videotapes describing the impact 
of the loss of the victim on their loved ones.154 The California 
Supreme Court upheld the use of these videos since the videos 
merely “implied sadness” and did not contain a “clarion call for 
vengeance.”155 In a statement respecting the denial of certiorari, 
Justice Stevens expressed concern that these videos may be 
unduly prejudicial, cautioning that that they may “put[] a heavy 
thumb on the prosecutor’s side of the scale in death cases,” and 
that “the Court has a duty to consider what reasonable limits 
should be placed on its use.”156 Justice Stevens’s concern 
demonstrates the importance of video evidence relative to oral 
testimony. Stevens was concerned that these videos could be 
prejudicial because they were more forceful than written 
statements and brief oral testimony that had been upheld in 
previous decisions.157 If the government prohibits citizens from 
recording police conduct, it potentially prohibits citizens and 
police from presenting forceful evidence in their defense at trial. 
                                                                                                                  
149 Id. at 969. 
150 Id. at 979 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
151 Id. (“In the Age of YouTube, there’s no need to take my word for it: There is a video of 
the incident that I’m ‘happy to allow . . . to speak for itself.’” (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 
372, 378 n.5 (2007))). 
152 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5 (providing a link to the video at issue and allowing the 
video to “speak for itself”). 
153 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008). 
154 Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
155 Id. at 565 (quoting People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 558 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied 129 S. 
Ct. 564 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156 Id. at 567. 
157 Id. 
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IV. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF ENFORCEMENT OF ALL-PARTY 
CONSENT STATUTES AGAINST CITIZEN RECORDERS 
The current trend of enforcing all-party consent statutes against 
citizen recorders has several negative consequences. First, given 
that all-party statutes are properly construed to protect the privacy 
rights of citizens158 and that police have at best a limited 
expectation of privacy,159 enforcing all-party statutes against 
citizen recorders criminalizes innocent conduct and contributes to 
the so-called “overcriminalization phenomenon.”160 Second, 
enforcement of all-party statutes may in some circumstances 
violate the First Amendment. And third, even though a legislative 
solution appears to be in order, an amendment to permit police 
recording has proven to be difficult to achieve, and absent a non-
legislative response these problems will remain. 
A. Overcriminalization 
Applying all-party consent wiretapping statutes to citizen 
recordings of police seems to fall within what one commentator 
calls “the overcriminalization phenomenon,” which refers to “the 
implementation of crimes” that are “deficient in harmful 
wrongdoing and beyond any legitimate rationale for state action 
. . . .”161 Due to an “enlargement in governmental authority and 
the breadth of law enforcement prerogatives,” the amount of 
criminalized conduct has expanded, at times producing absurd 
results.162 The main problem with overcriminalization is that it 
leads to “sentences that cannot contribute to the traditional goals 
of punishment in any meaningful sense.”163 Overcriminalization is 
a particular concern today, as prison overcrowding has become a 
major issue that state legislatures and courts have struggled to 
address.164 
                                                                                                                  
158 See supra Part I.D (analyzing the legislative history of two all-party consent statutes 
and concluding that they were intended to protect the privacy of citizens, rather than the privacy 
of public officials). 
159 See supra Part II.A (arguing that police have a limited expectation of privacy). 
160 Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005). 
161 Id. at 716–17. 
162 Id. at 704. Among the absurd criminal statutes detailed in this piece are an Alabama 
statute making it a felony to “train a bear to wrestle,” a Tennessee statute which prohibits 
“hunt[ing] wildlife from an aircraft,” and a federal statute prohibiting placing advertisements on 
the American flag in the District of Columbia. Id. 
163 Id. at 716. 
164 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (upholding an order which 
required the State of California to release an estimated 46,000 prisoners to remedy constitutional 
violations associated with overcrowding). 
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As previous sections of this Note have discussed, all-party 
consent statutes are privacy statutes and cannot be properly 
construed to apply to recordings of on-duty police.165 And 
recording police officers while they perform their public duties is 
beneficial both to the public and the police.166 If recording police 
is beneficial to society and does not intrude on police officers’ 
legitimate privacy rights, it does not follow that this is conduct 
that ought to carry with it a criminal penalty. In the Graber 
incident, for instance, the trooper whom Graber recorded arguably 
“suffered no real harm,” whereas Graber was “incarcerated 
overnight” and “had to endure the stress and expense of felony 
charges . . . .”167 Another important factor is that police regularly 
record citizens through dashboard-mounted cameras during traffic 
stops.168 Considering that recording on-duty police is not overly 
harmful to police and that police often record their own 
interactions with citizens, preventing citizens from recording 
police seems to serve no legitimate purpose of punishment.  
B. First Amendment Issues 
Another argument against applying all-party consent laws to 
police recordings is that the application might violate the First 
Amendment’s guarantee that no law shall be made “abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”169 Some commentators argue 
that creating a video recording is a form of speech.170 But even if 
                                                                                                                  
165 See supra Part II (arguing that the proliferation of recording devices and the nature of 
police work suggest that all-party consent statutes do not apply to police officers). 
166 For a discussion of the benefits of citizen recording, see supra Part III. 
167 Radley Balko, Maryland Judge Tosses the Felony Wiretapping Charges Against 
Anthony Graber, REASON.COM (Sept. 27, 2010), http://reason.com/blog/2010/09/27/maryland-
judge-tosses-the-felo.  
168 See Skehill, supra note 81, at 997 (“Police departments have . . . taken advantage of 
recording technology by documenting public rallies and traffic stops.”). 
169 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
170 See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 81, at 519 (finding that “First Amendment 
jurisprudence suggests that there is a positive constitutional liberty to gather and receive 
information regarding matters of public interest, and, within the ambit of this protected 
expression, to record public police actions without state interference”); Seth F. Kreimer, 
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to 
Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 339 (2011) (arguing that “[i]n today’s world, personal image 
capture is part of a medium of expression entitled to First Amendment cognizance”); Skehill, 
supra note 81, at 1002–03 (finding that courts have found a First Amendment right to record 
police misconduct); Wasserman, supra note 69, at 658–60 (finding a First Amendment right to 
record police deriving from the freedom to petition to the government). But see Kies, supra note 
81, at 296–97 (finding that, while the “First Amendment’s Free Press Clause protects civilians’ 
right to record the police,” limitations on that right may be constitutionally permissible only 
after a “thorough assessment of the countervailing interest at stake and the state’s proffered 
interest in protecting it”). 
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a video recording is a form of speech, all-party consent statutes 
might not unconstitutionally abridge that speech.  
First, all-party consent statutes appear to be content neutral,171 
since they are a flat prohibition on recording conversations 
without the consent of all parties and make no reference to the 
content of those communications.172 Second, these statutes do not 
appear to be impermissibly overbroad. A court can strike down a 
statute as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications 
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.”173 Arguing that all-party statutes are overbroad 
presents two seemingly insurmountable problems. First, there are 
few reported prosecutions for recording police. Second, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the overbreadth 
doctrine is “strong medicine” and that it should be “employed 
. . . sparingly and only as a last resort.”174 Finally, all-party 
consent statutes do not appear to be impermissibly vague. There 
are two grounds for invalidation based on vagueness: (1) a statute 
does not provide notice that enables a reasonable person to know 
what it prohibits; or (2) a statute “authorizes or encourages 
seriously discriminatory enforcement.”175 In either case, all-party 
consent statutes are fairly clear in that they prohibit recording 
without the consent of all parties. A court would have to stretch to 
strike down an all-party consent statute for being impermissibly 
vague. 
Nevertheless, a recent decision from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit found that the right to record police 
was implicit in the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of 
                                                                                                                  
171 It is generally acceptable to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech as long as 
that regulation is reasonable, content neutral, “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest” and “leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quotations and citations 
omitted). The government could assert a myriad of “significant” interests in justifying this 
speech restriction, most obviously the interest of promoting effective law enforcement. 
172 The “principal inquiry” in determining whether a regulation is a regulation of content is 
“whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys.” Id. 
173 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. 
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)) (quotations omitted). 
174 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).  
175 United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008) (citation omitted). The Court 
recently changed this standard, without explanation, from voiding a statute for vagueness “[i]f it 
authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” to voiding a law if it 
“authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Cristina D. Lockwood, 
Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 258 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 
(2000), for the former standard and Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1845, for the latter) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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speech and freedom of the press.176 In Glik v. Cunniffe,177 Simon 
Glik brought a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that his 
arrest for filming several police officers arresting a man on the 
Boston Common violated his rights under the First and Fourth 
Amendments.178 The court framed the question as a narrow one: 
“is there a constitutionally protected right to videotape police 
carrying out their duties in public?”179 “Basic First Amendment 
principles, along with case law from this and other circuits,” the 
court held, “answer that question unambiguously in the 
affirmative.”180  
The Glik court reasoned that the freedom of the press 
guaranteed by the First Amendment protected a citizen’s right to 
record police.181 The court acknowledged that “the right to film is 
not without limitations” and “may be subject to reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions.”182 But the court found that Glik’s 
recording was protected by the First Amendment because he 
recorded the police in a public place and because he peacefully 
recorded the officers from a reasonable distance.183 Because the 
First Amendment restrains police from disciplining individuals for 
verbally opposing police action,184 the court concluded that the 
same restraint “must be expected when [the police] are merely the 
subject of videotaping that memorializes, without impairing, their 
work in public spaces.”185  
The Glik court went beyond merely finding a First Amendment 
right to record police; in its view, the First Amendment 
“unambiguously”186 protects the rights of citizens to record police, 
and that that right is “firmly established.”187 The Glik court had to 
analyze whether this right was firmly established because the 
                                                                                                                  
176 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”); see also Kies, supra note 81, at 295 (concluding that “[b]ecause 
civilian recorders of police activity gather news of public concern . . . they should constitute 
members of the press protected by the First Amendment”). 
177 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
178 Id. at 79. 
179 Id. at 82. 
180 Id. 
181 See id. ( “It is firmly established that the First Amendment’s aegis extends further than 
the text’s proscription on laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,’ and 
encompasses a range of conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of information.” 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I))). 
182 Id. at 84. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. (citing City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987)). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 82. 
187 Id.  
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defendant police officers in Glik raised the defense of qualified 
immunity due to their status as public officials.188 In the First 
Circuit, courts apply a two-pronged analysis when a public 
official raises a claim of qualified immunity: “(1) whether the 
facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a 
constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right was ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged violation.”189 
The Glik court relied primarily on Iacobucci v. Boulter,190 a First 
Circuit case upholding a journalist’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit 
against police officers who arrested him for refusing to stop 
filming public officials in a hallway outside of a public meeting 
room.191 The Glik court noted that, although the lawsuit was 
“largely grounded in the Fourth Amendment and did not include a 
First Amendment claim,” the Iacobucci court rejected the 
officer’s qualified immunity defense because “the plaintiff’s 
journalistic activities ‘were peaceful, not performed in derogation 
of any law, and done in the exercise of his First Amendment 
rights, [and, therefore, the officer] lacked the authority to stop 
them.’”192 Relying on the cursory nature of Iacobucci’s First 
Amendment analysis to find the right to record police is firmly 
established, the Glik court observed that the “brevity of the First 
Amendment discussion” in Iacobucci was “a characteristic found 
in other circuit opinions that have recognized a right to film 
government officials or matters of public interest in public 
space.”193  
There are several limitations to the Glik holding that make it 
problematic as a solution to the enforcement of all-party consent 
statutes against citizen recorders. First, the case law relied on by 
the Glik court contains a somewhat perfunctory analysis of the 
First Amendment issue, which may not be sufficient to convince 
other courts. The Glik court found the sparseness of the analysis 
in other cases addressing citizen recording to be persuasive, 
reasoning that the “terseness” of this analysis “implicitly speaks 
                                                                                                                  
188 Id. at 81. 
189 Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 
190 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999). 
191 Id. at 17–18, 25. 
192 Glik, 655 F.3d at 83 (quoting Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 25). 
193 Id. at 85 (citing Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(acknowledging that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what 
public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public 
interest” and finding that the plaintiff had “a right to videotape police activities,” but holding 
that the plaintiff failed to show that those rights were violated)); see also Fordyce v. City of 
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding, without further analysis, that there is a “First 
Amendment right to film matters of public interest”). 
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to the fundamental and virtually self-evident nature of the First 
Amendment’s protections” of citizen recordings of police.194 
Other courts, however, have refrained from relying on arguments 
whose analysis or discussion is perfunctory.195 Second, even if 
one accepts that the Glik court’s holding was legally sound, “it is 
inconsistent with the realistic application of the law; ironically, 
the case itself proves that citizens are still being arrested for what 
the court describes as a ‘well-established’ and ‘fundamental’ 
principle of law.”196 Given these limitations, the extent to which 
courts outside of the First Circuit would follow the holding in 
Glik is unclear. 
C. Difficulties with Re-Drafting All-Party Consent Statutes 
Following the Hyde opinion and the Graber incident, several 
commentators proposed legislative solutions that would allow 
citizens to record police.197 Re-drafting all-party consent statutes 
to allow citizens to record police officers, however, can be 
problematic. For example, one commentator proposed that the 
Massachusetts wiretapping statute could be brought “in line with 
the majority of states that allow for the surreptitious recordings of 
on-duty police officers” if the legislature added an exception for 
situations where “a party has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy” to the statute.198 This commentator argued that this 
exception would apply to almost all on-duty activities of police 
officers because “it is commonsensical that police privacy rights 
                                                                                                                  
194 Glik, 655 F.3d at 85. 
195 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 223–24 (1997) (declining to 
decide a First Amendment argument because the district court answered the question in only a 
“perfunctory discussion” and because the parties devoted little attention to it in their briefs). 
196 Caycee Hampton, Case Comment, Confirmation of a Catch-22: Glik v. Cunniffe and 
the Paradox of Citizen Recording, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1549, 1556 (2011) (quoting Glik, 655 F.3d at 
85). 
197 See Alderman, supra note 81, at 531 (concluding that because “[t]here is a fundamental 
democratic and practical evidentiary value in any recording of public police conduct” that 
“[s]tate legislatures should move quickly to adopt statutory exceptions to the criminalization of 
civilian recordation of police in the fulfillment of their public obligations”); Bodri, supra note 
35, at 1349 (arguing that because the use of all-party consent statutes to prosecute citizens for 
recording police “unconstitutionally burdens the First Amendment right to gather information of 
public importance,” is “bad public policy,” and “incorrect judicial practice,” that “[t]he scope of 
the right to gather information of public importance must be legislatively clarified to include 
recording on-duty officers”); Kies, supra note 81, at 307–10 (proposing an amendment to the 
Federal Wiretap Act that would allow citizens to record police, with certain exceptions); Mishra, 
supra note 39, at 1555 (urging that states “explicitly permit citizens to record police 
communications other than those uttered with the reasonable expectation that they would not be 
recorded”); Skehill, supra note 81, at 1011 (proposing an amendment to the Massachusetts all-
party statute). 
198 Skehill, supra note 81, at 1011. 
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[are] diminished while on-duty.”199 Another commentator argued 
that Massachusetts and other all-party consent states should 
amend their wiretapping statutes to “explicitly permit citizens to 
record police communications other than those uttered with the 
reasonable expectation that they would not be recorded.”200 The 
theory behind this exception is that police cannot reasonably 
expect to have privacy rights while communicating with citizens, 
whereas they could reasonably expect to have some right to 
privacy in their “private spaces.”201  
Each of these standards would likely allow the video recording 
of most interactions between police and citizens. But there are 
several instances where police officers’ activities could fall 
outside of the reach of these revised all-party statutes where 
recording the conversation may nevertheless be beneficial to 
citizens. The Graber arrest presents an example of a case on this 
margin, in which a court may find it difficult to determine 
whether the officer involved had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy. Graber was pulled over and given a traffic citation by a 
plain-clothes officer.202 Although the judge in the Graber case 
determined that this officer had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy since the interaction took place during a traffic stop,203 the 
judge may have concluded differently if a citizen recorded an on-
duty police officer in a private place, such as the citizen’s home.  
The Flora court, while rejecting the state’s claim that the 
police had a legitimate expectation of privacy, emphasized that 
whether a police-citizen encounter is “private” must be a fact-
specific inquiry.204 A “fact-specific inquiry” of the Graber case 
could lead to a different conclusion, depending on the amount of 
weight a judge gives to the fact that the arresting officer was a 
plain-clothes officer.  
These amendments may also make it difficult to determine 
whether on-duty police officers have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when they are in public, but not interacting with citizens. 
Flora rejected the state’s claim that a public arrest was a private 
conversation,205 but nothing in the Flora decision suggests that the 
holding was meant to apply beyond the sort of conversation that 
                                                                                                                  
199 Id. 
200 Mishra, supra note 39, at 1555. 
201 Id. at 1556. 
202 See Shin, supra note 11, at A1. 
203 See Hermann, supra note 82, at 1A. 
204 See State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (“Determining whether 
a given matter is private requires a fact-specific inquiry.”). 
205 Id. at 1358. 
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took place in Flora—“statements [the police] make as public 
officers effectuating an arrest.”206 To avoid these difficulties, a 
clear policy of non-enforcement of all-party consent statutes in 
police-citizen encounters would benefit both citizens and police. 
Perhaps the most serious problem lawmakers who might be 
susceptible to amending state all-party statutes face is the sure 
opposition from the police, an unquestionably powerful lobby.207 
Legislators who support a statute that explicitly grants citizens the 
right to record police may jeopardize their reelection bids. For 
example, Mississippi’s legislature recently proposed an 
amendment that “would allow cameras, film, and other recording 
devices to be used while uniformed officers . . . are performing 
duties related to their office, as long as the person filming doesn’t 
interfere [with those duties].”208 The bill died in committee,209 due 
in part to opposition from law enforcement groups.210  
A recent Congressional effort reached a similar fate. In 2010, 
Representative Edolphus Towns introduced a concurrent 
resolution to the House of Representatives which resolved that 
“members of the public have a right to . . . make video or sound 
recordings of the police during the discharge of their public duties 
. . . .”211 This bill also died in committee.212 While there is no 
indication that this bill faced opposition from law enforcement 
officials, law enforcement officers may not have felt a need to 
oppose this resolution, since concurrent resolutions do not have 
the force of law.213 That this resolution had no legal impact and 
                                                                                                                  
206 Id. at 1357. 
207 Balko, supra note 77 (finding that there has been “little activity in state legislatures to 
prevent [arrests of citizen recorders]. . . . because any policy that makes recording cops an 
explicitly legal endeavor is likely to encounter strong opposition from law enforcement 
organizations”). 
208 Newsom, supra note 123.  
209 HR 168 – History of Actions / Background, MISS. ST. LEGISLATURE, 
http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/2011/pdf/history/HB/HB0168.xml (last updated Mar. 1,. 2011). As 
an aside, this amendment was unnecessary. Mississippi is a one-party consent state, and 
therefore it was already legal for citizens to record police officers. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41–
29–531(e) (West 2011) (providing that the statute does not apply to a person “not acting under 
color of law who intercepts” an oral communication “if the person is a party to the 
communication, or if one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the 
interception”). 
210 See Newsom, supra note 123 (reporting that the author of the bill recognized there were 
“law enforcement groups [who] oppose[d] the measure” and that the bill would likely die in 
committee). 
211 H.R. Con. Res. 298, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Kies, supra note 81, at 309 
(discussing the resolution). 
212 Legislation: H. Con. Res. 298, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hc111-298 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).  
213 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “concurrent resolution” 
as one that “expresses the legislature’s opinion on a subject, but does not have the force of 
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still died in committee, however, is telling of the difficulty 
legislators would face in passing an amendment specifically 
allowing citizens to record police.  
An explicit proposal may lead to a debate divided along party 
lines and may be particularly difficult to pass given that 
“[m]embers of Congress increasingly put the strategic interests of 
their party, and its hopes of doing better in the next election, 
above all else and vote accordingly.”214 Given the current 
polarized political climate, legislators may be reluctant to 
introduce legislation that would paint them as being “anti-police.” 
Since these efforts carry a great degree of political risk and stand 
little chance of success, this Note proposes that it would be better 
to look outside of the legislative process for a solution. Rather 
than amending all-party statutes, police and prosecutors should 
employ a scheme of voluntary non-enforcement of all-party 
consent statutes against citizen recorders.  
V. POLICE AND PROSECUTORIAL NON-ENFORCEMENT AS A 
SOLUTION 
The constitutionality of applying all-party statutes to police 
recordings remains an open question in all but the First Circuit,215 
and efforts to re-draft these statutes have proven fruitless. The 
question, then, becomes how to fix the problems with all-party 
consent statutes without striking them down as a whole. Police 
departments and prosecutors should adopt a policy of non-
enforcement of all-party consent statutes against citizen recorders. 
In eleven of the thirteen all-party consent states, in which all-
party consent statutes specifically apply only to “private” 
communications, these statutes do not seem to apply to citizen 
recordings of police.216 Even the Massachusetts and Illinois 
                                                                                                                  
 
law”); see also Kies, supra note 81, at 309 n.263 (noting that this resolution is an “admirable 
step toward protecting civilian recordings of police activity” but that its “primary weakness” is 
that “even if adopted, it will lack the force of law”). 
214 David Wessel, Editorial, An Untested Model of Democratic Governance, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 5, 2012, at A2. Wessel finds that the present polarization in Congress is caused by a 
multitude of factors, including an increased political homogeneity in neighborhoods and 
congressional districts and the proliferation of cable TV and websites which “mak[e] it easier 
for voters to find information that confirms their views.” Id. 
215 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (answering the question whether 
“there [is] a constitutionally protected right to videotape police carrying out their duties” 
in the affirmative). 
216 For the argument that eleven of these statutes specifically reference “private” or 
“confidential” communications and therefore do not apply to recordings of police officers, see 
supra Part I.B. 
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statutes, which apply to the secret recording of any conversation 
whether private or not,217 are privacy statutes and do not seem to 
properly apply to recording police officers.218 Prosecuting citizen 
recorders for innocent conduct under an erroneous or overly strict 
interpretation of these statutes raises questions about the 
legitimacy of law enforcement. Law enforcement agents must lead 
by example, because when “the Government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law.”219  
A. Advantages of Non-Enforcement to Police Departments 
As noted earlier, law enforcement groups have resisted 
amendments to all-party statutes that would permit citizens to 
record police.220 Despite this resistance, the idea that police 
departments would voluntarily agree not to enforce all-party 
consent statutes may not be as far-fetched as it sounds. Police in 
two Pennsylvania townships have adopted a written policy which 
allows citizens to record on-duty policemen.221 The townships 
established the policies as part of an agreement reached with 
ACLU attorneys in a case involving the prosecution of a citizen 
recorder.222 The agreement provides not only that the townships 
will not enforce all-party consent statutes against citizens 
recording on-duty policemen, but also requires the townships to 
train police officers pursuant to this new policy.223  
There may also be a financial incentive for police departments 
not to pursue these charges. In July 2010, the city of Beaverton, 
Oregon had to pay a $19,000 settlement to a man who was 
arrested for recording police officers.224 In August 2010, a Florida 
woman charged with violating Florida’s all-party statute for 
recording her son’s arrest filed a lawsuit against the police 
                                                                                                                  
217 For a discussion of these statutes, see supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra Part II (arguing that under United States v. Katz and other privacy cases that 
police officers have a lessened expectation of privacy while on duty, and therefore that applying 
all-party statutes do their actions is an improper application of the statutes). 
219 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
220 See supra Part IV.C (concluding that efforts to amend all-party consent statutes to 
specifically allow recording of police would face such political opposition that a non-legislative 
solution would be preferable). 
221 See Wendy McElroy, Are Cameras the New Guns?, GIZMODO (June 2, 2010, 5:00 PM), 
http://gizmodo.com/5553765/are-cameras-the-new-guns (describing the policies of two 
Pennsylvania municipalities, Spring City and East Vincent Township).  
222 See ACLU of PA Announces Settlement for Man Arrested for Videotaping Police 
Officers in Public, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF PA. (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://www.aclupa.org/pressroom/acluofpaannouncessettlemen.htm (describing the case and the 
terms of the settlement). 
223 Id. 
224 Balko, supra note 10, at 28.  
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department after charges against her were dropped.225 Police 
departments that charge citizen recorders under all-party consent 
statutes may wind up saddled with expensive penalties and court 
costs. And the end result of the prosecution, on top of the damage 
award or settlement, might be a judicial order or settlement that 
forces the police to allow citizens to record their actions. 
But if police departments instead adopt a policy of non-
enforcement, it may help to improve the public’s confidence in 
the police as an institution. Tom Wiseman, an attorney for the 
State of Illinois, justified bringing charges against a citizen for 
recording police by arguing that there were no problems with “bad 
police officers” in Crawford County.226 And according to 
Wiseman, “[t]here’s just no reason for anyone to feel they need to 
record police officers in Crawford County.”227 The person who 
made this recording, however, felt that “he was being unjustly 
targeted by local authorities” and would probably disagree that 
there is “no reason” to record police officers in Crawford 
County.228  
The notion that there is “no reason”229 to record police officers 
contravenes basic notions of government transparency. To quote 
Justice Brandeis, “[s]unlight is . . . the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.”230 And if police 
officers are behaving properly, there is no reason to forbid people 
from recording them. For instance, in the shooting death of Todd 
Blair described in the Introduction,231 the video enabled the public 
to see for itself that the suspect approached the police in an 
attacking motion232 and arguably demonstrated that shooting Blair 
in self-defense was justified. Charging citizens with felonies for 
recording police suppresses these recordings and creates the 
impression that the police do not want to expose their actions to 
public scrutiny. Police could improve the appearance of 
                                                                                                                  
225 See Bybee, supra note 85 (reporting that Jim Green, an ACLU attorney, filed a civil suit 
against the Boynton Beach Police Department alleging that Tasha Ford, the woman who made 
the recording, was “wrongfully arrested” and “had the right to record the interaction”). 
226 See Balko, supra note 77 (reporting that Wiseman was pursuing charges against 
Michael Allison, a “construction worker who recorded police officers and other public officials 
he thought were harassing him”). 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914). 
231 See Alberty, supra note 4 (reporting that a police officer shot and killed Todd Blair in 
self-defense after Blair approached the officer holding a golf club above his head).  
232 Id. 
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legitimacy of law enforcement if they adopt voluntary policies of 
non-enforcement of all-party statutes against citizen recorders, 
and open their actions up to public scrutiny. 
B. Advantages of Non-Enforcement to Prosecutors 
Prosecutors who are asked to prosecute citizen recorders can 
and should exercise their discretion not to pursue such charges. 
Prosecutors have discretion to “decline to charge entirely.”233 
Generally, the legislature’s role is to decide what should and 
should not be considered a crime.234 But legislators often draft 
criminal statutes that “cover either too much or too little” criminal 
conduct.235 When a statute produces unforeseen results, and 
particularly when it leads to criminal charges for non-
blameworthy behavior, a prosecutor may use his or her discretion 
not to prosecute the offense.236 Further, if legislatures feel that 
citizens should be prohibited from recording police, then non-
enforcement would impel state legislatures to confirm that there is 
a public consensus that videotaping police should be 
criminalized.237 As a practical matter, “[c]riminal statutes are a 
grant of power to police and prosecutors, who can choose how 
aggressively and in what cases to exercise that power.”238 
The result of the Anthony Graber incident makes a good case 
for prosecutorial discretion. On July 7, 2010, prior to the outset of 
the Graber case, the Office of the Attorney General of Maryland 
issued an advisory opinion on the applicability of Maryland’s 
wiretapping statute to police recordings.239 This opinion 
                                                                                                                  
233 Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 369, 369 (2010). 
234 Id. at 371 (“Police and prosecutors should not have free rein to decide what conduct to 
criminalize and how severely to punish it. Democratically elected legislatures can better . . . 
sort[] the most blameworthy and harmful acts from those that do not deserve punishment.”). 
235 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
547 (2001). 
236 Bibas, supra note 233, at 372 (“[N]o criminal code can spell out crimes and 
punishments to fit every conceivable scenario. . . . [W]hatever the legislature does not address, it 
implicitly delegates to prosecutors and other criminal justice actors.”). 
237 See Robert Misner, Minimalism, Desuetude, and Fornication, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 
1, 4 (1999) (arguing that courts and prosecutors who opt to dismiss charges against unmarried, 
pregnant teenage women for fornication can “avoid creating a broad right of sexual privacy for 
teenagers” while at the same time ensuring “that if the legislature wishes to continue 
criminalizing fornication, the legislature must confirm that a public consensus remains to retain 
fornication as a crime”). 
238 Stuntz, supra note 235, at 549. 
239 Advisory Op. from the State of Md. Office of the Attorney Gen. to the Honorable 
Samuel I. Rosenberg (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter Md. Advisory Op.], available at 
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Topics/WIRETAP_ACT_ROSENBERG.pdf.  
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concluded that, because the Maryland wiretap act specifically 
applied to “private communications,”240 it did not apply to citizen 
recordings of police officers.241 The opinion based this conclusion 
on “the holdings of the courts in most other states construing state 
eavesdropping statutes.”242 This opinion put the prosecutor in the 
Graber case, Joseph Cassilly,243 in the awkward position of 
prosecuting a citizen using an interpretation of the Maryland 
wiretap statute that had been repudiated by the Attorney General 
of Maryland. Unsurprisingly, the charges against Graber were 
dismissed.244 In other all-party consent states, there are only a 
handful of prosecutions against citizen recorders that have been 
upheld.245 Most of these prosecutions have either been overturned 
or thrown out of court.246 Prosecutors who proceed with charges 
against citizen recorders may face an uphill battle, and in all 
likelihood face a potentially embarrassing legal defeat. Simply 
refusing to proceed with these charges may be to the benefit of 
prosecutors. 
C. Public Awareness Campaigns Regarding Permissible Citizen 
Recording 
If individual police departments and prosecutors are unwilling 
to adopt a policy of non-enforcement, at a minimum they could 
help citizens to avoid being ensnared by all-party consent statutes. 
                                                                                                                  
240 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10–401(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2011). 
241 Md. Advisory Op., supra note 239, at 10.  
242 Id. at 10–11. 
243 See Balko, supra note 77 (discussing the charges Cassilly filed against Graber). 
244 See Hermann, supra note 82, at 1A (reporting that the charges against Graber were 
dismissed because the judge found that a conversation between a police officer and a citizen on 
a public road is not a private conversation). 
245 See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971 (Mass. 2001) (upholding charges 
against a citizen for secretly recording police officers during a traffic stop). There are two 
citizen recording cases currently pending in Illinois, whose all-party statute is the strictest in the 
country. See Don Terry, Eavesdropping Laws Mean That Turning On an Audio Recorder Could 
Send You to Prison, CHI. NEWS COOPERATIVE (Jan. 22, 2011), 
http://www.chicagonewscoop.org/eavesdropping-laws-mean-that-turning-on-an-audio-recorder-
could-send-you-to-prison/ (reporting that a Chicago man and woman were separately charged 
with Class 1 felonies carrying a potential 15-year prison sentence for recording police). The 
Illinois all-party consent statute flatly prohibits recording someone without his or her consent, 
“regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a 
private nature.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14–1(d) (West 2003). 
246 See People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ill. 1986) (applying a previous version 
of the Illinois all-party consent statute and holding that a man who recorded police officers 
during a traffic stop did not violate that version of the statute); see also State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 
1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a conversation pursuant to a citizen’s arrest is 
“not entitled to be private” and therefore that the Washington all-party consent statute did not 
forbid the recording at issue); Bybee, supra note 85 (reporting that charges were dropped 
against a Florida woman who recorded police officers during her son’s arrest). 
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Criminal statutes should not be a “trap for the unwary 
innocent.”247 There are steps that police, prosecutors, and citizens’ 
groups should take to inform citizens about how to avoid 
unwittingly falling within the snare of all-party consent statutes. 
For example, citizens who openly record police do not violate all-
party consent statutes. All-party consent statutes generally refer to 
“secret” or “surreptitious” recordings of police officers.248 The 
Hyde decision points out that if a citizen recorder “inform[s] the 
police of his intention to tape record [an] encounter” or holds the 
recording device “in plain sight,” the recording does not violate 
an all-party consent statute because the recording is no longer 
secret.249 Police departments in all-party consent states should 
engage in public awareness campaigns that inform citizens of 
permissible methods of recording police encounters. Similar to 
non-enforcement, this would save resources needlessly wasted in 
prosecuting citizen recorders, and could also bolster public 
confidence in the police. Citizen groups in all-party consent states 
should also engage in public awareness campaigns, especially if 
police departments choose not to. If citizens in all-party consent 
states are informed of their rights, they may be less likely to fall 
victim to a prosecution under an all-party statute.  
CONCLUSION 
All-party consent wiretapping statutes were enacted with the 
worthy goal of protecting citizens from being recorded without 
their knowledge or permission.250 But the proliferation of 
recording devices and people’s increased tendency to use those 
devices, it has become increasingly easy for citizens to make 
surreptitious recordings. Police officers are public employees and 
many of their interactions with citizens take place in public areas. 
Privacy laws such as all-party consent statutes should not apply to 
citizen recordings of their public, on-duty activities. The policy of 
non-enforcement proposed by this Note is in line with current 
                                                                                                                  
247 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). 
248 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (West 2000) (prohibiting the 
“secret” recording of a conversation unless all parties to the conversation consent). 
249 Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 971; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(3) (West 2011) 
(“[C]onsent shall be considered obtained whenever one party has announced to all other parties 
engaged in the communication or conversation . . . that such communication or conversation is 
about to be recorded.”). 
250 See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966–67 (alteration in original) (citation and quotations 
omitted) (looking to the legislative history of the Massachusetts all-party consent statute to 
determine that the legislature’s goal was to “strictly prohibit [the public from] electronic 
eavesdropping and wiretapping of other persons’ conversations without permission”). 
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technological and societal developments, and would be beneficial 
to police officers, prosecutors, and citizens.  
Rather than leaving it to citizens to mount a difficult and 
potentially futile constitutional attack, it would be for the best if 
police officers and prosecutors adopted a voluntary policy of non-
enforcement of all-party consent statutes against citizen recorders. 
A non-enforcement policy would alleviate concerns that recording 
police could lead to a lengthy prison sentence. There are also 
several benefits to non-enforcement, when compared to the 
amendments already proposed to all-party consent statutes.251 An 
explicit non-enforcement policy avoids the confusion in 
determining whether a conversation is “private.” And it would 
ensure that all citizens would have the opportunity to record 
officers and to preserve any incidents for trials. Non-enforcement 
could also bolster public perception of the police. By allowing 
citizens to record their public actions, the police would signal a 
new willingness to correct abusive tactics and change police 
procedure.  
The video of the King beating helped to visualize police abuse 
to the public, and although the aftermath of the King trial was 
devastating, it served to teach the lesson that the sort of abusive 
tactics employed by the police were unacceptable. Cell phone 
recordings of police abuse can help to serve the same function, 
and this proposal ensures that citizens’ rights to make those 
recordings are fully protected. From the King video in 1991 to the 
cell phone videos taken in the Oakland BART shooting, 
recordings have been an important part of informing the public of 
potential police abuse. Rather than risking that the next video to 
spark a national debate on police abuse goes un-filmed due to the 
filmmaker’s concern about being prosecuted for filming police, 
prosecutors and law enforcement officials in all-party consent 
states should adopt a clear policy of non-enforcement of all-party 
statutes against citizen recorders. 
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